Connatural knowledge is knowledge readily acquired by beings possessing a certain nature. For instance, dogs have knowledge of a scent-world exceeding that of human beings, not because humans lack noses, but because dogs are by nature better suited to process olfaction. As various ethicists have argued, possession of the virtues involves a sort of connatural knowing. Here, connatural knowledge emerges as a knowledge by inclination which systematically tracks the specific moral interests we humans possess precisely because we are human. In this essay we explore the importance of connaturality for moral education.

In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account – by way of suggestions for how to build a genuinely self-referring artificial agent – and a biological account, via a discussion of the role of somatoception in supporting and structuring self-awareness more generally. Central to the account is a discussion of the necessary motivational properties of self-representing mental tokens, in light of which we offer a novel definition of self-representation. We also discuss the role of such tokens in organizing self-specifying information, which leads to a naturalized restatement of the guarantee that introspective awareness is immune to error due to mis-identification of the subject.

Previous work in a young Hawaiian forest has shown that nitrogen (N) limits aboveground net primary production (ANPP) more strongly than it does decomposition, despite low soil N availability. In this study, I determined whether (a) poor litter C quality (that is, high litter lignin) poses an overriding constraint on decomposition, preventing decomposers from responding to added N, or (b) high N levels inhibit lignin degradation, lessening the effects of added N on decomposition overall. I obtained leaf litter from one species, Metrosideros polymorpha, which dominates a range of sites in the Hawaiian Islands and whose litter lignin concentration declines with decreasing precipitation. Litter from three dry sites had lignin concentrations of 12% or less, whereas litter from two wet sites, including the study site, had lignin concentrations of more than 18%. This litter was deployed 2.5 years in a common site in control plots (receiving no added nutrients) and in N-fertilized plots. Nitrogen fertilization stimulated decomposition of the low-lignin litter types more than that of the high-lignin litter types. However, in contrast to results from temperate forests, N did not inhibit lignin decomposition. Rather, lignin decay increased with added N, suggesting that the small effect of N on decomposition at this site results from limitation of decomposition by poor C quality rather than from N inhibition of lignin decay. Even though ANPP is limited by N, decomposers are strongly limited by C quality. My results suggest that anthropogenic N deposition may increase leaf litter decomposition more in ecosystems characterized by low-lignin litter than in those characterized by high-lignin litter.

For the purpose of contributing to a clarification of the term “process”, different kinds of musical processes are investigated: A rule-determined phase shifting process in Steve Reich's Piano Phase (1966), a model for an indeterminate composition process in John Cage's Variations II (1961), a number of evolution processes in György Ligeti's In zart fliessender Bewegung (1976), and a generative process of fractal nature in Per Nørgård's Second Symphony (1970). In conclusion I propose that six process categories should be included in a typology of processes: Rule-determined, goal-directed and indeterminate transformation processes, and rule-determined, goal-directed and indeterminate generative processes.