In this chapter I argue that strategic privatisation policies were preferred to restitution by post-communist CEE governments. These policies were independent of the political colour of the respective governments, since executives dominated by former communists, as in the case of Romania, could enact wide privatisation legislation at the beginning of transitional period, in a similar fashion as governments dominated by a more ‘liberal’ outlook, somewhere else in the region. Using the examples of Romanian and Poland, two countries which followed the other ends of the restitution spectrum in Central Eastern Europe, I also argue that restitution, a legal institution that it was already in the Civil Codes of the CEE countries, did not need any particular legislation in order to be implemented by the courts. However, when local or national politicians refuse to implement court decisions’ to restitute property to the former owners, as in the case of Romania, there is not much that international judicial bodies or (even) the European Court of Human Rights could do. Finally, I argue that what is termed as ‘post-communist restitution’ should be analysed from the perspective of the policies distributive or transformational of the regimes of property followed by CEE governments at the onset of transition in the region, and not as a standalone legal institution. Seen this way, the failures of restitution in the region point towards the failure of transitional measures aiming at privatising state property in CEE, rather than toward a breakdown of restitution as transitional justice mechanism.